How WWII Ended?

To Bomb or Not to Bomb? According to the standard U.S. high school textbooks of history, Hirohito, the emperor of Japan, announced the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, after two atomic bombs had been dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the American bombers, thus ending the second world war. There have been constant debates and reinstatements regarding the decision made by President Truman to drop the atomic bombs ever since. Most of the discussions on the subject are focused on the necessity of the use of the bombs. On one end of the spectrum, the supporters of the decision are emphasizing the sparing of American soldiers' lives and the seemingly effects of the bombs, pushing Hirohito to announce the surrender. On the other end, the opponents are claiming the emperor had already sensed the inevitable defeat and would have surrendered, given a favorable term, without witnessing the horrible effects of the bombs. By analyzing all the articles on both sides, in general, the supporters are usually arguing based on incorrect or insufficient historical data, and even fallacious logic. However, most of the opponents are frequently falling into false belief in certain myth, ignoring the war criminality of Emperor, Hirohito, or disrespecting the consensus among the allies. So, some discussion on the fundamentals and the revelation of historical facts should precede the meaningful analysis and final conclusion on the matter. 1. How to make any enemy surrender? There are basically two ways to make any enemy surrender:  a. To make your enemy surrender by providing an acceptable term or by threatening to end the leader's life, which is a common practice in wars involving feudal kingdoms and empires in human history before the birth of modern democratic republics. (Empire of Japan is one archetypal example of those feudal monarchs.)  b. To make your enemy not able to conduct the war by eliminating the leader's commanding structure, destroying a significant portion of the fighting forces, the weapon manufacturers, the infrastructure, transportation and communication, the industrial resources, the gasoline, food and water supplies, or occupying a critical portion of the territories, etc. 2. Did the Truman administration follow the guidelines to win the war? In the summer of 1945, the top U.S. governmental officials from the newly sworn-in president down didn't seem to follow the essential guidelines to win the war against the Empire of Japan, although the end of war was so near. They were making at least the following five mistakes: a. Not recognizing the Japanese effort to relocate their capital. It's indisputable that from the summer of 1942 to that of 1945, the American Navy in the Pacific, almost single-handedly, defeated and reduced the once most powerful navy on Earth, the Imperial Japanese Navy, down to a wreckage. All the Japanese cities are within the bombing range of the American bombers, either land-based heavy to medium bombers or carrier based light bombers. However, the Japanese Army was still in nearly full strength in Manchukuo and the occupied territories of China. Although the Japanese government was sensing the ultimate defeat in the future, there was no imminent need to comply with the Allies' unconditional surrender. An intense negotiation was in progress with the Soviet Union with the hope that the Soviets would continue to stay neutral. In the meantime, the Japanese government had already started the relocation process to move the central government from Tokyo to Hsinjin(New Capital in Japanese, nowadays Changtsun), Manchuria, to continue their fight with near one million untouched Kwantung Army soldiers, in the spring of 1945, for fear of possible destruction or occupation of Tokyo by the American forces. The Japanese imperial military thinking follows the doctrine of the traditional Chinese military. When an empire still has the strength to fight offensively, she should not stay defensive; when she still has the ability to defend herself, she should not try to retreat; when she still has the option to retreat, she should not consider surrendering; for the emperor, when surrendering is allowed, there's no need to fight to death, nor to commit suicide. It is fair to say that the Japanese government would not consider surrendering, unless Manchuria was invaded. Predictably, dropping an atomic bomb at Nagasaki would just waste a bomb and slaughter a huge number of civilians unnecessarily. b. Being so indulged in an unproven myth that no effort was made to destroy the Japanese commanding structure. For reasons seldom exposed, there was one myth only entertained in the U.S. Department of War, but not in the whole Chinese population, nor the whole Soviet population, i.e., if the Japanese Emperor was harmed, the Japanese would fight to their last end. This is a completely illogical thinking for there's never such a phenomenon observed, nor recorded in the whole human history. This is basically suggesting that the allies should cooperate together with the Japanese military forces to protect the life of the Japanese Emperor in order to guarantee the victory over Japan possible. Had any American aviator dropped a bomb which resulted in the death of the Japanese Emperor, should he have been tried by court martial for prolonging the war? To make it clear, if the Japanese Emperor had witfully chosen not to surrender, the Americans would have had to make sure that he would have been the last Japanese to be touched, even after some one-month-old babies and 100-year-old ladies. The history proves the other way. Whenever the head of a feudal monarch was killed, the monarch either collapsed or suffered a crisis. By not trying to threaten Hirohito's life directly, the American government was violating the essential guidelines of war and choosing to slaughter more Japanese soldiers and civilians unnecessarily, while prolonging the war at the same time. c. Not knowing how and where to use the atomic bomb. The Department of War had no thorough planning, regarding how to use the atomic bombs to achieve the strategic goals of war, i.e., to shorten the time of war and to reduce the ally casualties.  Emperor, Hirohito, had already demonstrated he had no remorse over the high Japanese civilian casualties incurred after the incendiary bombing of Tokyo in March, 1945, by the American bombers. Furthermore, he demonstrated his aloofness again by refusing to surrender, after President Truman having threatened a "prompt and utter destruction" brought onto his country.  Bombing militarily irrelevant cities would not reduce ally casualties and killing civilians would not shorten the war, since it would not make a self-proclaimed divine emperor blink. d. Lacking coordination with other ally forces, mainly the Soviets.  During the Yalta conference in February, 1945, President Roosevelt acquired the consent from the Soviet dictator, Stalin, to send troops to Far East to help the Americans defeat the Japanese. During the Potsdam conference in July, the same year, Stalin affirmed his promise to President Truman to invade Manchuria in early August.  The American government could have made efforts to support the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and expected to observe the Japanese government changing their status regarding surrender from refusal to consideration, since by that time they would have realized their retreat being cut off and their Kwantung Army destroyed. e. Trying to start another war. Other than to finish the on-going war as soon, as just, as moral as possible, the Truman administration might have another priority, i.e., to start another war, a cold one. President Truman had the Potsdam conference postponed for two weeks for the first atomic bomb test of mankind. Then, during the Potsdam conference in July, 1945, President Truman was informed of the successful explosion of it. The meeting turned more confrontational than cooperative, afterwards. On July 26, the United States, the British Empire and the Republic of China issued the unconditional surrender declaration to the Japanese government. It would have been much more effective, had the Soviet Union been persuaded to join the declaration. Truman seemed to care more about how to end the war soon enough that the Soviets would occupy less territories of Japan, how to demonstrate the power of the atomic bomb to intimate the Soviets, how to keep the Japanese imperial system intact, so it could serve the same purpose as that of the Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire in 1936, and how to finish the war the way that the cold war can start in a condition benefiting the American capitalists. 3. How did the history really play out? After having been informed of the Potsdam Declaration, urging the unconditional surrender of the Empire of Japan, Emperor Hirohito did not convene any cabinet meeting on the subject of surrender.  On the side, without waiting for the incoming invasion of Manchuria by the Soviets, on August 6, President Truman rushed to drop the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima, killing 100,000 Japanese, of which the absolute majority were civilians. It was hardly a military target. There would be no surprise that Emperor Hirohito did not even bother to respond. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on the Empire of Japan. Then, shortly after the midnight, the mighty Red Army crossed the border of Soviet Union and Manchuria. The Japanese cabinet of six convened at 10:00am, August 6, ten hours after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, following the traditional doctrines of war, I.e., when retreat is not impossible, surrender is the next step. Unfortunately, another unnecessary bomb was dropped at Nagasaki at around 11:00am, killing another 60,000 hapless civilians. So, it suffices to say that the two atomic bombs were dropped at the wrong places, at the wrong times, on the wrong groups of people, for the wrong purpose.  Then, on August 15, Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan to the Japanese people and the Allies. Afterwards, General MacArthur exonerated the indisputable culpability of Emperor Hirohito, suggesting the emperor only had the power to end a war, but no power to start a war. And, Japan was quickly rehabilitated into an Anti-Soviet bastion. 4. Some what-if thoughts. Dropping two atomic bombs on nonmilitary people and objectives is horrible.  However, it could have been worse if the Soviets had not invaded Manchuria on August 9, 1945. According to the U.S. governmental documents, the Truman administration had a total twelve atomic bombs in hands. Had Emperor Hirohito chosen not to respond to the American atomic bomb calamity, there would have been a total of 12 cities destroyed and around one million Japanese, mainly civilians, killed. (U.S. had a total of 12 atomic bombs made around the time.) Could Emperor Hiroto interpret the bombing of irrelevant civilians as a message, "Don't worry, we won't hurt you, if you don’t surrender."? We probably would never know. 5. One thing for sure. If the Americans cannot learn history in a serious and critical way, our days of being the leader of the world are numbered. References: Behr, Edward. Hirohito behind the Myth. New York: Villard Books, 1989. Lo, Guanzhong and Moss Roberts. Three Kingdoms. Foreign Languages Press, 2008. Stone, Olive and Peter Kuznick. The Untold History of the United States. Gallery Books, 2012.